U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Main Findings Despite its impressive expansion, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is more of a "decision-taker" than a "decision-maker," with its growth driven by top-down political directives from leaders like Xi Jinping rather than by its own institutional influence. The PLAN's bureaucratic influence within the high command remains modest, with minimal representation on the powerful Cent…

Number 13 Recommended Citation Swope, Charles Nathan and Lacey, James (2026) "Rome: Strategy of Empire," Naval War College Review: Vol. 79: No. 3, Article 13. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss3/13 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibility standards under the Rehabilitation Act of 19…

Number 11 Recommended Citation Ambler, Harold and O’Hara, Vincent P. (2026) "The Greatest Naval War Ever Fought," Naval War College Review: Vol. 79: No. 3, Article 11. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss3/11 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibility standards under the Rehabilitation …

Number 12 Recommended Citation Romero, Michael and Dolin, Eric Jay (2026) "Left for Dead: Shipwreck, Treachery, and Survival at the Edge of the World," Naval War College Review: Vol. 79: No. 3, Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss3/12 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibili…

Just five years ago, scholars with extensive Washington policy experience assessed that a civil-military relations crisis existed. They perceived that military perspectives were dominating the Pentagon during the first Trump administration. One book accused Secretary of Defense James Mattis of shirking his responsibility to maintain meaningful civilian control. Frustrated, midlevel policy officia…

Two cases, almost eighty years apart, in which a weaker power—the Confederacy and imperial Japan—sought to achieve an end to the war before the United States could mobilize its material advantages and before the weaker side’s limited resources ran out provide useful insights into this western Pacific conundrum. Studying the failure of both challengers bears particular lessons for the United State…

After retiring from the Navy, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance took on the role of U.S. ambassador to the Philippines. Thomas Buell, a prominent Spruance biographer, previously has claimed that Spruance’s involvement in the 1953 Philippine presidential election was ethically questionable, a perspective challenged by new research.

Fascist Italy’s campaign to secure and command oceanic sea-lanes in the period between 1935 and 1943 marks a noteworthy failure in interwar strategy. Such a glaring historical moment—particularly the failure to raise a suitable navy capable of achieving Italy’s geopolitical objects—demands further inquiry to uncover how and why this project fell far short of its projected aims.

Ukraine’s suppression of Russian naval activity by using unmanned surface and aerial vehicles provides a backdrop against which the concept of a “reconnaissance strike complex” is updated for naval warfare today. This framework reflects a path forward for future naval operations.

American war mobilization doctrine is built on an industrial-era paradigm that assumes the primary contest is material: who can most efficiently convert economic capacity into military power. An evaluation suggests that this paradigm, while necessary, is no longer sufficient.

Number 3 Recommended Citation Walker, Darryl "D-Day" Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College (2026) "President's Forum," Naval War College Review: Vol. 79: No. 3, Article 3. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss3/3 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibility standards under …

Evaluating strategic frameworks for today’s Navy involves updating historical strategies for current realities. Given the deindustrialization of the nation, paired with China’s rapid economic expansion, new strategies for maintaining a relevant naval force must be considered.

Number 2 Recommended Citation Tangredi, Sam J. Editor-in-Chief (2026) "From the Editors," Naval War College Review: Vol. 79: No. 3, Article 2. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss3/2 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibility standards under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and are preser…

Recommended Citation China Maritime Studies Institute (2026) "Education and Engagement," CMSI Quarterly Review: Vol. 1: No. 6, Article 6. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-quarterly-review/vol1/iss6/6 Accessibility Request Some items in this repository were created or digitized prior to implementation of the accessibility standards under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and are p…

Navies worldwide are once again grappling with the implications of emerging technologies, most notably autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI). The anticipated disruptions these technologies likely will cause should not be taken lightly, but historical context helps add perspective.