Biomedical moral enhancement seeks to adapt human morality to contemporary global challenges. This is to be achieved, among other means, through pharmacological, technological, or genetic interventions that modify so-called core moral dispositions. Although the specific list remains contested, most proposals assume that these dispositions are conceptually and, within cognitive neuroscience, ontologically well defined, empirically measurable, and thus in principle amenable to potential biomedical interventions. This paper aims to demonstrate the untenability of these assumptions. Using empathy as a case study, it demonstrates that these dispositions arise not from a shared formal cognitive ontology but from folk psychology. This leads to inconsistent definitions and operationalisations across disciplines, impeding consensus formation and precluding systematic one-to-one mapping onto neural structures. Consequently, even agreement on the relevant dispositions would not ensure feasibility, which constitutes a serious, though not fundamental, obstacle. The paper concludes by proposing a substantial reduction in the original ambitions and a shift toward education and currently available, testable tools with the potential to support moral reflection. ( direct link )
