This paper formulates the concept of synesthetic science as an independent epistemological method. The point of departure is the observation that dominant scientific paradigms systematically exclude embodied, affective, and neurodivergent forms of perception as subjective, distorted, or methodologically unusable. This position is explicitly rejected here. It is shown that certain neurodivergent perceptual profiles—particularly synesthetic, highly sensitive, and embodied forms of cognition—do not merely constitute perspectives or experiences, but epistemic instruments with specific quality criteria. Within synesthetic science, affect, overstimulation, resonance, and somatic feedback do not function as sources of disturbance, but as indicators of structural inconsistency, threshold transgression, and ontological rupture. The paper explicitly distinguishes synesthetic science from subjectivism, intuitionism, and introspective self-observation, and formulates criteria of reproducibility, falsifiability, and methodological validity under structural conditions. Finally, it is argued that synesthetic science is not a special case, but a previously missing instrumentarium for the detection of complex, non-linear world-relations. ( direct link )
