Analytic philosophy's highlight reel is a gallery of splittings. Frege split 'is' three ways and 'meaning' into sense and reference; Gettier prised apart the faces of 'knows'; the truth literature stabilised into three families; 'possible' fissioned into metaphysical, epistemic, and conceptual; and Kripke's separation of the necessary, the a priori, and the analytic was received as a revolution. This appendix argues the pattern has a shape and the shape has a mechanism. Ordinary words are bundles: labels lashed to clusters of distinctions that need never respect the boundaries between what is real, what is grasped, and what is said, three registers the book's main text orders by containment. Language is optimised for coordination, and coordination tolerates mixed addresses. The person who knows where the well is, believes truly where it is, and can say where it is behaves identically in the village, so one word suffices, until a hard case pulls the faces apart, and two speakers using one word, each keyed to a different face, produce the appearance of a single disagreement where there are two compatible claims and no common question. Mature analysis is the repair: one term per register. Kripke's tripartition is the centrepiece, exactly one term per register, and terminal. Nothing has fissioned from it since, and on this reading nothing can, because there is no fourth register. What the tradition performed brilliantly it never explained: why the damage recurs, where it clusters, and which direction it runs. The appendix supplies the aetiology from the book's own resources. A mind constituted by distinctions cannot positively image what outruns its registrations, so it substitutes the nearest registrable surrogate, which predicts that confusions cluster exactly where reality outruns access (value, modality, consciousness, the ultimate ground) and that illicit inferences run characteristically upward, from what can be said or known to what is. The theory is set against its neighbours, Carnap's explication, Ryle's category mistakes, Chalmers on verbal disputes, and the conceptual-engineering programme, which the appendix argues has repairs without a theory of the damage. It names its own predictions and failure conditions: 'emergence' and 'information' are fissions in progress whose completion the reading forecasts, and three findings that would refute it are stated. A closing section extracts the book's grading-and-dependency apparatus as a subject-neutral method any philosophical system could adopt, compared with the calibrated-confidence vocabularies that transformed climate science and evidence-based medicine. The appendix adds no new premise to the book; it is the book's own engine, run in the open. This paper is Appendix B of Dyology: On Diversity and Equality; the method it extracts is the one the book itself runs on, graded and dependency-tracked from its first chapter to its last.