Merit is routinely asked to perform more moral work than it can bear. In public argument, economic rewards are treated as evidence of contribution, contribution as evidence of effort, and effort as evidence of deservingness. Economic insecurity exposes the instability of this chain. A person may work diligently yet remain unable to secure housing, care, transportation, health, or the time required for political and personal agency. Conversely, a person may receive large market rewards because of ownership, bargaining position, inherited advantage, or favorable institutional rules rather than superior effort. This paper develops a framework for justice after merit: an account in which judgments of achievement retain a limited role only after the background conditions of cooperation have been assessed. Drawing on Rawls, Nozick, Sen, Anderson, and contemporary work on desert and inequality, it distinguishes four concepts that meritocratic discourse often collapses: moral desert, historical entitlement, productive contribution, and market price. It then argues that differential rewards gain merit-based legitimacy only when four conditions are satisfied: fair access to the relevant opportunity, a defensible relation between the rewarded trait and social contribution, protection against domination through severe insecurity, and public transparency concerning how rewards are generated. Neither Rawlsian justice nor Nozickian entitlement supports reading market position as a direct measure of moral worth. The resulting view rejects both the abolition of responsibility and the moralization of market outcomes. It defends a social minimum, fair opportunity, accountable institutions, and a more modest vocabulary of achievement as conditions for making merit honest.