The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute represents a landmark in international criminal law by articulating the mental element (mens rea) for intentional crimes in Article 30, establishing it as a general rule applicable to all crimes within the Court's jurisdiction unless otherwise provided. This article addresses the core research problem: despite Article 30's ambition to define intent and knowledge comprehensively in relation to material elements (conduct, circumstances, and results), the provision contains ambiguities regarding the precise components of mens rea such as the interplay of will, desire, awareness, and consent which have generated interpretive challenges in judicial practice and scholarly analysis. The primary objective is to identify, define, and analytically examine the key components of the mental element as outlined in Article 30 and the Elements of Crimes document, elucidating their role in establishing criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The central research question is: What are the precise components of the mental element (will, awareness, desire, and consent) in ICC crimes, how do they relate to the material elements of conduct, circumstances, and results, and what exceptions or interpretive nuances arise in the Statute and jurisprudence? Employing a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes, and ICC case law, the findings reveal that Article 30's "intent" encompasses three interrelated components will (volition in conduct), awareness (knowledge of circumstances and results), and desire (wish for results), with consent treated as a ground for exemption rather than mens rea. Awareness of foreseeable results via ordinary events suffices even without direct desire, while motivation is irrelevant except in specific-intent crimes like genocide. These clarifications resolve ambiguities, enhancing foreseeability and judicial consistency in international criminal law.