Liberal political theory often treats stability as a property of institutions: laws are obeyed, offices persist, and citizens continue to cooperate despite disagreement. This paper argues that such an account is incomplete when the burdens of maintaining order are displaced onto households living under chronic economic uncertainty. Drawing on Rawls’s idea of stability for the right reasons, it develops an account of stability from below. A political order is stably legitimate only when citizens can affirm its terms without being forced by avoidable insecurity to absorb unpredictable costs, defer essential needs, or submit to arbitrary power. Economic precarity matters not simply because it lowers welfare but because it degrades the temporal and social conditions of public reason. Citizens who cannot plan, exit, contest, or recover from ordinary setbacks encounter institutions as sources of risk rather than as fair terms of cooperation. The paper identifies six dimensions of stability from below: material sufficiency, temporal predictability, nonarbitrary administration, effective recourse, political voice, and credible institutional reciprocity. It argues that these dimensions connect Rawlsian legitimacy to capabilities, relational equality, and empirical research on household fragility and institutional trust. The view does not make legitimacy depend on constant satisfaction or require the state to remove all uncertainty. It distinguishes unavoidable risk from institutionally manufactured precarity and democratic resilience from the mere endurance of unequal burdens. The result is a public-reason standard under which stability must be justified not only by the continuity of institutions but by the terms on which ordinary people are asked to keep them going.