This paper develops a general epistemological framework for evaluating purported religious revelation. The central claim is that the epistemic problem posed by a religious source is not exhausted by the familiar question whether the source can authenticate itself. Religious belief is ordinarily presented through a narrative: a creator exists, communicates with a prophet, the prophet understands the communication, transmits it faithfully, and the surviving sources accurately preserve the transmission—or some substantially different narrative is offered instead. Any such narrative may entail the divinity or authority of the source conditional on its truth. But this conditional entailment does not itself provide warrant for accepting the narrative. The rational question is therefore prior: why should the agent accept the story on which the source's authority depends? The paper argues that this problem generalizes across radically different apologetic strategies and that it is best understood as a problem of narrative selection and epistemic discrimination. A further distinction is developed between psychological naivety and epistemic naivety. An agent need not explicitly reason that a proposition is true merely because someone asserted it. Nevertheless, a justificatory standard can be structurally equivalent to this rule if its application is invariant with respect to the truth-relevant features that distinguish the candidate proposition from its alternatives. Such a standard may confer justification on arbitrarily many incompatible narratives. The resulting framework yields a general constraint: a truth-directed justificatory standard must possess sufficient discriminatory sensitivity to the features that distinguish a hypothesis from relevant alternatives. Mere compatibility, assertion, experiential force, coherence, or narrative elaboration cannot by themselves perform this role.