Abstract Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) proved that informationally efficient markets are impossible because efficiency destroys the incentive to produce information. Their proof rests on an assumption so foundational that the subsequent literature has never examined it: that trading profit is the sole return to information production. This paper relaxes that assumption. When economic agents can publish structured, timestamped, attributed judgments and accumulate track record capital - a portable professional asset whose value does not depend on whether the price has already moved - information flows into prices as a byproduct of career capital formation rather than trading. The contradiction falls away because the assumption that generated it turns out to be a modeling choice, not a logical necessity. A CARA-normal (constant absolute risk aversion, normally distributed signals) general equilibrium model with two markets and three agent types formalizes the resolution. In the augmented economy, a judgment market operates alongside the asset market, compensating agents for demonstrated calibration quality. The central result (Proposition 1) is that information production cannot fall below the disclosure channel's contribution regardless of how informative prices become: noise trading can collapse the trading channel entirely without disturbing the disclosure channel. Proposition 2 establishes a surprising equivalence - uninformed agents receive the same total scalar precision as in the standard Grossman-Stiglitz equilibrium, but the composition changes, with a portion now entering as structured public reasoning rather than through the noisy price signal. The augmented equilibrium weakly Pareto-dominates the original (Proposition 3), and the judgment market does not generate its own reflexive paradox because track record returns depend on supply and demand for calibration rather than on price informativeness (Proposition 4). Beyond the paradox resolution, the two-channel structure makes visible a relationship between competition and cooperation that the original framing concealed. Disclosers cooperate by sharing reasoning publicly; traders compete by transmitting that reasoning into prices. Neither channel functions without the other - together they produce a coordination system where information production and price efficiency reinforce each other instead of trading off. This competition-cooperation synthesis has a structural parallel in the open-source development model, a game-theoretic restatement as an equilibrium shift from Nash toward Pareto, and a suggestive thermodynamic analogy linking information preservation to reduced reconstruction cost. The paper develops the economic argument in full, specifies the formal model, identifies the transmission mechanism, presents the synthesis across four disciplines at different levels of formality, and derives testable predictions with identification strategies. This paper is the first demonstration that a single economic mechanism manifests simultaneously across economics, computer science, mathematics, and physics - a concrete instance of the unification that the Prolegomena to the Unification of Economics, Computer Science, Mathematics, and Physics proposes. JEL Codes: D82, D83, G14, C72, D47 From a forthcoming book by Gregory Caldwell Beier. Gregory Caldwell Beier Susarb LLC, Cambridge, Massachusetts