Moral equality is often expressed through the language of equal worth, equal consideration, equal treatment, and equal concern. These formulations are related, but they are not interchangeable. A parent who gives more time, attention, and resources to a child than to a stranger does not thereby imply that the stranger has lesser human worth. A friend who remains at a hospital bedside may be acting on a reason created by friendship rather than denying the equal standing of everyone else. The philosophical problem is therefore not simply whether partiality is permitted. It is how unequal concern can be morally structured without becoming a denial of equality. This article develops a bounded relational account of partiality. It distinguishes four claims that are frequently collapsed: equal moral worth, equal consideration, equal treatment, and equal concern. Equal worth concerns status. Equal consideration requires that no person's interests be dismissed merely because that person is socially distant. Equal treatment is context-sensitive and may require differences when needs, roles, or responsibilities differ. Equal concern concerns the structure and intensity of an agent's practical attention, and it can legitimately vary when relationships generate special reasons. The paper argues that special relationships can be reason-giving because they create histories of dependence, commitment, trust, vulnerability, promise, shared projects, and second-personal expectation. It introduces Relational Non-Substitutability to explain why the duties of a parent, friend, spouse, colleague, or caregiver cannot always be transferred to an anonymous equally competent substitute without moral loss. The value at stake is sometimes not merely that help be delivered, but that it be delivered by the person whose relationship makes the response intelligible as owed. At the same time, partiality has moral limits. The article distinguishes required partiality from permissible partiality and identifies conditions under which special concern becomes favoritism: when relationship is used to erase another person's standing, to capture a public institution, to distribute common goods by private loyalty, or to shield serious wrongdoing. A central distinction therefore emerges between the ethics of private relationship and the ethics of public office. The reasons that justify choosing one's child for private care do not justify choosing one's child for a public position for which others have equal claims. The conclusion is that equality and partiality are not rival moral systems. Equal moral worth sets the floor beneath every relationship; special relationships can add further reasons above that floor. The moral task is not to eliminate unequal concern, but to make it answerable to the equal standing of those outside the relationship. A defensible ethics of partiality therefore requires both relational depth and impartial limits.